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This article argues that the institutional “home” and “host” country effects on
employment policy and practice in multinational corporations (MNCs) need
to be analyzed within a framework which takes more account both of the
multiple levels of embeddedness experienced by the MNC, and processes of
negotiation at different levels within the firm. Using in-depth case study ana-
lysis of the human resource (HR) structure and industrial relations and pay
policies of a large U.S.-owned MNC in the IT sector, across Germany, Ireland,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, the article attempts to move towards such a
framework.
 
Introduction
 
The issue of employment relations in the foreign operations of U.S.-
owned multinational corporations (MNCs) has attracted the attention of
researchers for many years. The extensive literature has pointed to MNCs
of American origin being more standardized, formalized, and centralized in
international policy making when compared with those of other nationalities
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(Young, Hood, and Hamill 1985; Negandhi 1986; Yuen and Kee 1993;
Harzing 1999). It has also indicated that U.S. MNCs are particularly hostile
to collective worker representation, and more likely to deploy HRM
practices such as direct forms of employee involvement (Enderwick 1985;
Dunning 1998; for a review, see Edwards and Ferner 2002).
Within the industrial relations field, however, many such studies have
lacked a clear theoretical framework. One approach to revealing the nature
of employment relations in the foreign operations of U.S. firms has been to
compare them with either a sample of local firms or groups of MNCs from
other countries, and to attribute residual differences to the “American” influence
(Buckley and Enderwick 1985; Innes and Morris 1995). However, this is not
a means of explaining differences, it is merely a model of attribution.
A second approach can be termed “culturalist” in that the focus is prima-
rily on the values and attitudes prevalent in the United States and the way
that these shape the choices made by senior managers in determining
employment practices. One variant of this approach is the use of Hofstede’s
(1980) dimensions of national cultures (Ngo et al. 1998; Bae, Chen, and
Lawler 1998). It is sometimes used in conjunction with the residual
approach in that differences between groups of firms are ascribed to the
influence of  national cultures. However, this too does not provide an
explanation for the home country influence since it simply begs a further
question: Why do particular sets of values and attitudes characterize a given
country?
An alternative to such explanations is to conceptualize a national econ-
omy as a “national business system,” in which sets of interlocking structures
and institutions in different spheres of economic activity combine to pro-
duce a nationally distinct way of organizing economic activity (Whitley
1992; 1999). The competencies of firms, as well as their economic behavior,
are thus seen as embedded within social, economic, and political institu-
tions at national level. In relation to MNCs, the business systems perspec-
tive leads to a focus on the ways in which institutions in the home country
inform the behavior of firms at the international level, and the way this may
be modified to fit the institutional context of various host countries. This
approach appears to provide a more promising basis than the cultural
approach for explaining the home and host country influences that shape
an MNC’s approach to managing its workforce across borders, since it
offers a way of understanding how prevalent values and attitudes become
historically established, and potentially challenged over time.
If  firms are embedded in national business systems, such that their stra-
tegic choices, including those in employment relations, are shaped by soci-
etal institutions, then it follows that MNCs should be seen as having ties to
 278 / P
 
 
 
A
 

 
 
 
 .
 
multiple countries, not only the system of the country from which they
originate, but also those of the host societies in which they operate. In order
to understand the dynamic interplay of these business system effects, it is
therefore necessary to compare the behavior of MNCs across different host
country environments.
This paper is based on case study research into one large U.S. MNC in
the IT sector, code-named “ITco”. In order to gain the fullest possible under-
standing of the dynamic interplay of the various “embeddedness” effects,
and how these relate to the wider decision-making process in a firm faced
with rapid market change, fieldwork was undertaken in four host countries
in Europe (Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the United Kingdom), as well as
at corporate headquarters in the United States and the European regional
headquarters (see below for methodological details). This research should
be interpreted as in-depth investigation into a “critical case,” in that it is a
globalizing firm, which because of the nature of its business, currently
requires substantial numbers of workers in each country in order to service
national markets. In examining the process of the management of human
resources in this firm, and practice in the areas of collective industrial rela-
tions and pay and performance management, we show how the institutional
configurations of the American business system have influenced its manage-
ment style in employment relations, as well as how this has been adapted
to operate in the business systems of the various host countries examined.
The case illustrates the importance of adopting a dynamic conception of
national business systems, and of  being attentive to the multiple levels
at which institutional forces influence management style in employment
relations. Moreover, the changing structure of the business and its human
resource management function, and the negotiation of outcomes at both
subsidiary and European levels, strongly indicates that employment
relations outcomes are not simply outputs of macro-level systemic factors
(or indeed competitive factors), but are continually negotiated within
the firm.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section outlines the specific
interpretation of macro-level institutionalism used as the research frame-
work for the paper. The following section discusses methodological issues,
highlighting the value of the single “critical case” approach adopted here,
as well as specifying details of the empirical methodology. Some basic back-
ground data on the company is also provided. The findings of the research
are divided into issues relating to the form of the HR function and how it
operates within Europe, and the substantive issues of the management of
collective industrial relations and pay and performance management.
Finally, the discussion evaluates the relative weight and changing nature of
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embedded home and host country effects, within a context of the dynamic
evolution of both home and host business systems, and links this macro-
institutional approach with micro-level issues of control and authority.
 
Institutionalist Approaches to the Analysis of Employment Relations in
MNCs.
 
In its simplest form, an institutionalist approach could focus on
home and host country institutions and see the nature of employment rela-
tions within the foreign subsidiaries of MNCs as the result of calculation
about how to balance these sets of influences. However, there are a number
of factors that make the calculation of likely outcomes considerably more
complex than a simple trade-off  between these two sets of factors. Edwards
and Ferner (2002), for example, identify four influences on MNC behavior,
namely country of  origin effects, dominance effects, pressures for inter-
national integration, and host country effects.
First, 
 
country of origin effects
 
 refers to elements of the behavior of MNCs
which can be traced back to the characteristics of the national business
system from which the MNC originates; in other words, the interlocking
relationships between societally constructed institutional forms in areas
such as industrial relations, training and education, the welfare state, the
nature of interfirm and intrafirm coordination within the economy, the
firm-level division of labor and of management roles, and the nature of
corporate finance (Maurice, Sellier, and Sylvestre 1986; Esping-Andersen
1990; Whitley 1992, 1999; Rubery 1994; Hall and Soskice 2001). There is
controversy as to the extent to which such effects remain prevalent
within globalizing MNCs (for opposing views, see Ohmae 1990; Hu 1992).
One strand of the literature claims that “transnational” corporations are no
longer best viewed as hierarchies, with the home country headquarters at
the apex and foreign operations as subordinate, but as networks of related
affiliates (Nohria and Ghoshal 1997), where managerial decision making is
dispersed rather than concentrated, lateral linkages between subsidiaries are
significant, and control is primarily exercised through normative integration
(Birkinshaw and Morrison 1995: 737). Such claims are frequently exagger-
ated, however, not least because capital provision remains predominantly
based in the country of origin (Doremus, Keller, Pauly, and Reich 1998),
and control tends to be exerted by nationals of the home country; for
example Ruigrok and Van Tulder (1995) found that 25 of the 30 largest U.S.
MNCs had no foreign nationals on the board of directors. Moreover, it has
been argued that the globalized nature of MNC operations has been exag-
gerated, with activities, particularly strategic functions such as R&D, being
disproportionately concentrated in the country of origin (Pauly and Reich
1997; Hirst and Thompson 1999).
 280 / P
 
 
 
A
 

 
 
 
 .
 
Turning to the specific nature of U.S. country of origin effects on employ-
ment relations, research has repeatedly shown that U.S.-owned MNCs are
more likely than those from other countries to have relatively centralized and
formalized systems of human resource and industrial relations management
(Ferner et al. 2004). Effectively, U.S. MNCs have tended to export the
organizational forms and management methods that were established in the
United States to serve continental-wide markets. They have thus introduced
to other countries the multidivisional organizational form, allowing the
management of  discrete businesses through strategic central control and
devolved bottom line responsibility, and encompassing a division of
management functions into distinct and highly specialized areas such
as production, finance, and personnel (Dunning 1998). Equally, the relative
reluctance of U.S. MNCs abroad to engage with systems of collective
employee representation can be traced back to the particularly hostile rela-
tionship between capital and organized labor in the United States, as well
as a more general opposition to state regulation of the employment relation-
ship, both of which have strong socio-historical roots (Jacoby 1997). It has
also been argued that the strong market-based norms behind the employ-
ment relationship in the United States have led to U.S. firms being keen to
export systems of performance appraisal and performance-related pay
(Muller 1998), and that the effects of the civil rights movement and antidis-
crimination legislation in the United States have led U.S. MNCs to adopt
relatively strong formal policies on “diversity,” which are often exported over-
seas, such that the managers of foreign subsidiaries are assessed against
diversity targets (Ferner, Almond, and Colling: forthcoming).
Second, the concept of 
 
dominance effects
 
 refers to the idea that dominant
or hegemonic states are able to exert organizational, political, and techno-
logical influences that invite dissemination and adoption across the global
capitalist system (Smith and Meiksins 1995). For instance, there is sub-
stantial evidence that in the post-WWII era, there were widespread state-
sponsored and voluntary initiatives within subsidiaries of U.S. MNCs to
diffuse American managerial and production techniques in western Europe
(Dunning 1998; for further discussion see Carew 1987; Djelic 1998; Clark
2000). At the level of the firm, dominance effects create an incentive on the
part of  firms to emulate the practices that they perceive to contribute to
the success of firms in dominant countries. Conversely, firms that originate
in dominant countries have an incentive to take advantage of what they see
as the factors that give rise to the economic strength of the country of origin
by “exporting” key practices to their foreign subsidiaries.
Third, international management specialists have made much of increased
 
pressures for international integration
 
 within MNCs (Prahalad and Doz
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1987; Adler and Ghadar 1990; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1998). This may be
attributed to reduced cross-national differences in consumer tastes, the
deregulation of product markets and the reduction of tariff  barriers, making
it more feasible for MNCs to achieve synergies between their subsidiaries
(Edwards and Ferner 2002). Much of this literature posits that pressures for
international integration of operations, and consequently of HR, are likely
to be high where: other MNCs represent a large proportion of the customer
base, leading to coordination of pricing, service, and support worldwide;
global competition is prevalent; firms have high fixed costs in R&D; pro-
duction is capital- and technology-intensive; undercost reduction strategies;
and where there is a universal product (Prahalad and Doz 1987). Hence, the
extent of these pressures will vary by sector and product market.
In addition to global integration, many MNCs face the pressure of pre-
senting a unified face to regionally integrated markets, and consequently
seek to achieve a degree of international integration within regions. Since
these pressures are particularly strong within the European Union—given
the freedom from formal barriers to trade, the harmonization of compe-
tition rules, and some, albeit limited, supranational development of industrial
and social policy (Marginson 2000)—we might expect the European head-
quarters of a globalizing U.S. MNC to have assumed a greater degree of
influence over employment relations, thus complicating the relationship
between home and host countries.
Finally, 
 
host business systems
 
 vary in terms of how “open” they are, making
them more or less amenable to external management styles (Whitley 2001).
In other words, the scope for home country-based “innovation,” taken here
to mean practices that are unfamiliar in the host context, may be related to
the degree and embeddedness of national regulation, such that “innovation”
in this sense may be easier in less actively regulated business and employment
systems. However, as is sometimes recognized among U.S. HR and IR aca-
demics, institutions may serve as resources as well as constraints (Kochan
and Osterman 1994; Levine 1995), meaning that high value-added resources
may well be located in high-skilled and highly regulated economies. Host
country effects do not only capture, as is sometimes implicitly assumed,
the constraining (and enabling) influences of  legislation or of  national
collective bargaining and representation structures, but also incorporate the
societally informed rationality of host country managers (Broad 1994;
Wächter and Müller-Camen 2001).
The strength of host country effects does not only depend on the co-
hesiveness of host institutions. The degree to which national economies are
dependent on foreign MNCs varies considerably from country to country,
even within the EU. Where this level of dependence is high, one might
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expect foreign MNCs to have a substantial collective impact on the nature
of the business system, as is the case, for example, in Ireland (Gunnigle et al.
2003). Moreover, the impact of host country effects on a given MNC will
depend on its degree of “locational flexibility.” Where the MNC can pro-
duce credible threats of relocation to more lightly regulated or lower cost
countries, or simply choose to operate in business systems which are of a
similar nature to that of the home country, the impact of host country
effects may be reduced. This degree of  locational flexibility varies by
product market, and wholesale relocation is much more difficult to achieve
in the service sector generally, although there is substantial and increasing
room for maneuver at the margin.
 
Towards a Dynamic, Multilevel Institutional Analysis.
 
One reason for under-
taking micro-level qualitative research in this area is to help establish what
effects apparent changes to national business systems, such as the widely
documented development of the “shareholder value” model of corporate
governance in the United States, have on the reasoning of actors and on
choices made. Equally, macro-institutionalist approaches risk attaching too
much emphasis to extra-firm institutions, and too little to organizational
politics at different levels within the firm. Different actors at all levels of the
organization will always retain some scope to pursue aims and goals of their
own. Even where actors at corporate level issue explicit guidelines or edicts,
these may sometimes be circumvented or interpreted liberally. There is, of
course, a wealth of evidence from the organizational sociology literature on
the space that actors possess within institutional constraints. For example,
in a classic study of the nature of bureaucracy in two French public sector
organizations, Crozier (1964: 189) argues that even those actors in a low
position within a hierarchy operate with a degree of autonomy:
 
There is always some possibility of play within the framework delimited by the
rules, and therefore dependence relations and bargaining are never completely
suppressed. . . . (R)ules cannot take care of everything and management must
rely on workers support and must therefore bargain for it.
 
Such negotiations of order are rendered more complex in multilayered
international firms. In the case of outcomes within the foreign subsidiaries
of MNCs, they cannot simply be read off  from a broad understanding of
host country business systems, but are the result of various actors, with
different power resources, negotiating what the nature of such host country
effects actually are.
Hence, the approach taken in the current research seeks to identify
country of origin, dominance, integration, and host country effects within
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one highly complex MNC, but avoids simply reading these off  from a con-
sideration of structural or institutional factors. We emphasize that each
group of potential effects varies across time and space, both in response to
external economic and macro-institutional change, and to the sub-micro
strategies adopted by actors at various levels of the organization. We also
stress the interrelated nature of the four influences in the framework. For
example, in small economies that are the recipients of considerable amounts
of FDI (foreign direct investment) from one particular country, as is the
case with Irish and U.S. FDI, the country of origin effects may have influ-
enced the host business system to such an extent that they have to some
extent become subsumed into host country effects.
 
Methodology
 
The data analyzed in the paper are drawn from a 3-year case study of a
large U.S.-based multinational in the IT sector (referred to as ITco), which
has formed part of a broader program of research into the HRM policies
and practices of U.S. MNCs within the EU. The key issue underpinning the
research concerns the dynamics of the relationship between home country,
host countries and globalizing pressures in order to investigate whether
MNCs with U.S. origins can be said to be peculiarly “American” in this
respect. This research program has involved collaboration between teams of
researchers in the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Ireland, with the
four teams working to common objectives and studying the same firms as
far as possible.
The firm’s markets have changed considerably in recent years. Whereas some
years ago the IT industry was dominated by hardware suppliers, the sector
is now seen as broken up into subsectors, with most firms striving to find a
niche in which they have a degree of monopolistic power. For instance, the
manufacturing of microchips is dominated by Intel and the development of
operating system software by Microsoft. Our case study company has a number
of business divisions, including the manufacturing of a range of products,
but the fastest growing division is IT services in which the firm maintains
and upgrades the IT systems of other firms on a subcontracted basis.
The concentration on a single case study has the limitation that case
studies are difficult to replicate and do not allow empirical generalizations
to be made. However, such cases are crucial to uncover patterns and practices
that were previously undocumented but subsequently turn out to be wide-
spread. A case study allows resources to be concentrated in a particular
firm, thereby extending the depth of the analysis and facilitating a greater
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range of concrete examples to be elaborated upon. Perhaps most significantly,
single case studies can be “critical cases” in that they provide particularly
interesting conditions in which to explore a phenomenon (Edwards, Belanger,
and Haiven 1994: 9). In relation to the issues at the heart of this paper, the
case study can be thought of as “critical” if the firm exhibits a highly distinc-
tive management style that is common in the country of origin and which
is transferred to its operations in quite different national IR systems.
ITco is just such a critical case. In the United States, ITco is a classic
“welfare capitalist” firm (Jacoby 1997); there has been a distinctive and last-
ing influence from the founding father; historically, a strong internal labor
market was linked to very high job security and very low turnover; pay is
still seen as relatively good and the company pioneered a range of fringe
benefits, such as sickness and holiday pay; and the management exhibits an
ideological antipathy to unions. While this welfare capitalist approach has
been challenged in recent years by the internationalization of  product
markets and the evolution of the financial markets, its heritage remains
evident. Because the company has significant operations in every country in
Europe, it is not the case that it has simply avoided those national systems
which present particular institutional barriers to its preferred way of
managing labor. If  it is to implement an anti-union, welfare capitalist
management style internationally, it is likely to be considerably more
difficult in the more regulated labor markets in which tightly knit institu-
tions constrain management’s room for maneuver than in more deregulated
labor markets.
The case study involved these distinctively American home country
effects being examined in quite different host country environments. Ger-
many is the most highly regulated of the four, with the complementary role
of unions and works councils clearly codified (Jacobi et al. 1998). This not
only constrains a multinational’s approach to employee representation but
also requires companies to negotiate the introduction of practices in a range
of areas (Muller 1999). Spain also has regulations concerning employee
representation at firm level, but representative bodies tend to be weaker
than in Germany, both in terms of their formal powers and their influence
in practice. The Spanish labor market has more generally undergone a
phase of  deregulation in recent years, particularly affecting the ease with
which firms can lay off  workers (Martinez Lucio 1998). The United
Kingdom and Ireland are much more deregulated than the other two
countries, with much weaker structures of employee representation (Edwards
et al. 1998; Gunnigle, McMahon, and Fitzgerald 1999). They are also
major bases for U.S. MNCs in Europe; it is estimated that FDI stock
from U.S. firms amounts to $3000 per head of population in Ireland, as
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compared to $2000 in Britain, $500 in Germany, and France, and $200 in
Spain (Economist 1997; OECD 2000).
The research design allowed the national research teams to choose to
examine the part of the company which has most significance within their
country. For instance, in Ireland, manufacturing is by some margin the
biggest division in terms of employment and this is where fieldwork was
conducted. In the United Kingdom, by contrast, the IT services division
has grown markedly in recent years, so it was this division that was the
focus of the study. While this approach does not enable us to compare
identical operations across countries, it has the advantage that it enables us
to examine issues of great significance in each country, and to relate these
to features of the host country’s national business system. In other words, to com-
pare similar facilities across countries would to some extent miss the point
of  how the company operates an international division of  labor for its
activities within Europe. Moreover, given that ITco’s operations are highly
stratified across countries in that the nature of the activities performed
varies from country to country, comparing identical operations would be
extremely difficult, sometimes impossible.
The focus of the fieldwork was twofold. First, we investigated the mana-
gerial structure within which HR policies were controlled and coordinated,
including the relationships between corporate, European regional, divi-
sional, and national levels of management. Second, we report on the sub-
stantive issues of pay and performance management and employee
representation. We might expect the need for MNCs to adapt their practices
in a way that makes them similar to other companies operating in the host
environment to vary across the two substantive issues. Specifically, pay and
performance management systems, particularly for managerial and pro-
fessional staff, are likely to be less subject to local isomorphic pressures than
the nature of employee representation. Both pay/performance and attitudes
towards collective representation are, however, key elements of the “welfare
capitalist” model that ITco has historically typified and are, therefore, issues
over which we might expect the HQ to exert a significant degree of influence.
This paper draws on data from six countries in total. Fieldwork has taken
place at the corporate HQ in the United States, at the European HQ and
in each of the four main countries in which the research teams are based.
We also draw on data from France—a country where a strong tradition of
state regulation of the workplace presents significant constraints on manage-
ment, at least in the areas of  restructuring and formal collective represen-
tation—though the extent and depth of  these data are not comparable
to the four principal countries. For understandable practical reasons, most
studies of MNCs have been focused in either the home country or in one
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particular host country. The former type of case study is not well placed to
judge how international policies are implemented in practice; the latter, on
the other hand, does not enable an evaluation to be made of how much of
what is observed is specific to that particular country. Our focus on multiple
levels and countries gets round these problems.
The primary method of gathering data has been the in-depth interview.
Interviewing followed a common template across the various countries
covering such issues as the locus and mechanisms of HR decision-making,
the organization of the HR function locally and cross-nationally (including
its link with business planning systems), and the detail of  practices in the
two substantive areas of employment practice identified above. This common
approach did not prevent interviewers in using their discretion in adding
questions appropriate to the particular national context or to the particular
type and level of respondent concerned. In total, the case study comprised
58 interviews.
The amount of data collected varied between countries. Nevertheless, the
comparability of the data across these countries stems from the core inter-
views with senior HR staff  in all of the four main countries. These were the
interviews for which close collaboration between the research teams took
place. In addition to these interviews, the national teams conducted addi-
tional research which varied according to access, resources, and the extent
of publicly available information. Overall, the study of ITco provides exten-
sive data with which to draw a cross-national comparison of a “critical case”
across quite different national systems. While it is of course only one com-
pany, and the extent of  our data varied across countries, we are well
positioned to try and “unravel home and host country effects.”
 
Key Findings
 
The findings from the case study are presented in two principal sections. The
first examines the nature of central influence over the European subsidiaries
through a consideration of the complex business structures in place and
how these have changed over time. The second assesses the evidence relating
to whether there is a distinctive embedded American influence over collective
employment relations and the management of pay and performance.
 
HR Processes and Structure.
 
One striking aspect of the coordination of
HR policy across countries in ITco is the way in which the extent of central
influence has shifted over time. Until the 1980s, the company was characterized
by a number of global policies issued by the corporate HQ which national
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managers were expected to implement. Some limited room was afforded
for these to be adapted to the demands of the various national systems in
which the firm operated, and country HR and other senior national
managers were accountable to those at corporate level for such accommo-
dations. During the late 1980s, the firm moved away from this highly
centralized approach, allowing more influence to national level management
to develop policies that suited their local circumstances. For example,
national level managers gained the autonomy to develop job evaluation
systems independently of the U.S. system, with the different European sub-
sidiaries building their own national systems based on a model developed
in the French subsidiary—a variation of this model later became global
policy, and hence used in the United States, although respondents claimed
that, in practice, the job evaluation system still retains elements that do not
allow direct comparison across different countries. The decentralizing
tendency was reversed in the early 1990s, and there has followed a period
during which strong coordination of HR policies between countries has
been reestablished. This takes place within a matrix structure consisting of
geographical regions (North America, Europe/Middle East/Africa, Asia–
Pacific, etc.) and product-based business units.
This reestablishment of strong central control has run alongside a change
in the operating principles of the subsidiary HR function. ITco has moved
from a global area structure with national HR managers responsible for
affairs in their subsidiary, to a regional European structure, with responsi-
bilities divided into functions (compensation, recruitment, etc.) reporting to
a European head. Hence, the region has become the predominant level in
most areas of HR policy, with the exception of the employee relations func-
tion, which was kept at the national level given the inevitability of relations
with collective labor in most continental European countries. The European
HR director is now seen by most of  our respondents as having a much
more influential role in policy development than hitherto. Alongside this,
there has been a marked reduction in the number of HR staff  at national
levels, particularly because of the introduction of a phone-based service
center operating from the United Kingdom, fielding basic HR-related
enquiries from across Europe. Staff  numbers in the Spanish HR function,
for example, fell by 50 percent immediately following the introduction of
the service center. It was also evident that national HR directors no longer
have the influential positions that they once did, though there was some
variation in this respect; compared with their UK counterpart, the German
and French HR directors continued to play key roles in operating the
complex and highly regulated systems of representation and bargaining in
place in these two countries.
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Meanwhile, at business divisional level, HR specialists have been rela-
beled “business partners,” who act as internal consultants, dealing with
issues such as appraisal, pay and benefits, and recruitment and attempting
to reconcile ITco corporate strategy with policies that best fit the business
needs of the business division (e.g. software, IT services, etc.). These part-
ners operate in conjunction with divisional line managers, and frequently
have responsibility for the detail of HR policy in a number of countries
within that division. Consequently, it is difficult to characterize this group
as being part of a national HR function.
Our interviews confirmed that corporate HQ had a strong preference for
uniformity globally. One quote, from an Irish employee relations specialist,
summarizes a fairly common feeling across subsidiary managers; “the United
States would like everyone to do everything the same across the world. I
think that’s an American thing, not just an ITco thing.” The Spanish respond-
ents also felt that regionalization was a new form of centralization: “By now
real power is in (European HQ). The local country manager works to assure
that local efforts are in line to achieve the corporate and business divisions’
strategies” (finance director, Spain). The centralizing tendency in HR policy
is perhaps best summarized by the Spanish HR director.
 
In HR, still we have three diverse types of practices, the identical ones (e.g.
recruitment), the similar ones (e.g. performance management) and the different
ones (e.g. industrial relations); however the homogenization tendency is very
clear. We still have the three kinds of practice because we come from the
opposite side (i.e., a polycentric approach) and the inertia and local customs
have an important influence. Those identical practices are the ones without any
legal implications in Spain . . . It’s just a matter of time before we’ll only have
identical and similar HR policies and practices.
 
However, subsidiary managers do see some advantages to dealing with a
European, rather than corporate headquarters because of the greater level of
appreciation of managers at the former level of intraregional differences, allowing
for greater flexibility, “because within Europe everything is so different, employ-
ment law, contracts (of employment). They (regional HQ) are a lot more used
to having to flex things in (Europe). Yes they will have to justify to the United
States, but they understand easier” (employee relations specialist, Ireland).
There is also some evidence that national subsidiaries retain the capacity
to develop strategies which are to some degree autonomous of corporate
approaches. This can occur in the area of HR policy itself. For instance, within
the German employment system, initial vocational training is of paramount
importance. As budgets have become more important than headcounts in
HR planning, the German subsidiary has to justify this investment in terms
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of profitability and expenses. One way to do this is to sell it as a local way
to achieve the corporation’s aim to build a highly qualified workforce:
 
“We have to discuss very intensively every year within the scope of planning
the vocational training, . . . how to defend the investment in the corporation”
(German HR manager).
 
More broadly, national subsidiary managers are aware of the possibility
of relocation of some facilities, and attempt to develop country-specific
strategies to defend and develop corporate investment in their host coun-
tries, often related to competitive advantage in terms of HR. For example,
much of the employment growth in ITco and other U.S. MNCs in Ireland
has been in the manufacturing area, the country being initially attractive as
a location for FDI as having a relatively lightly regulated employment
system, a favorable fiscal system, and low labor costs compared to its EU
competitors. Recent economic growth in Ireland, wage inflation and labor
shortages, and the expansion of  the EU endangers this position. Irish
management is attempting to address this problem:
 
We are at the moment close to 60 percent manufacturing dependent. Our
(business) strategy is to get that down to maybe 30 percent over 3 or 4 years
on the basis that the jobs they are doing now will not be sustainable or com-
petitive in this environment. We have to find ways of moving up the food chain
(country manager, Ireland).
 
Despite the oscillation of central influence over time, the growing influ-
ence of regions and divisions, and the moves by national level managers to
retain an influential role within the company qualify the picture of central
control in ITco, a distinctive influence from the corporate HQ on employ-
ment relations was still evident in the company. For example, while the
precise design and operation of the service center was left to regional man-
agers, the model was based on an earlier innovation in the United States.
Aside from the necessarily greater complexity and variety of workforce
nationality within the European center in order to deal with the linguistic
and legislative differences within the region, the functions of the centers
differ in that the U.S. center has wider responsibilities, including the adminis-
tration of the benefits program. The European version has not followed
suit, partly because of the national differences in legislation concerning
benefits within the European region. However, the two centers are very
similar in terms of their setup and work organization.
More broadly, while most respondents agreed that the European head-
quarters was of increasing significance in the transmission of policy, its
influence in the creation of policy was still limited:
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I am of course part of the global team and we have regular exchanges, but just
to show you a practical example, when we meet on a global level . . . you will
find one representative, that is me, from Europe, my counterpart from Asia,
and then you will find 18 Americans in the room! . . . Of course we will try to
(exert) some influence here, they’re all very polite to us, it’s very open, but at
the end of the day they will, more or less, from their understanding they will
(tell) us what they have developed (and ask us) how and if  we can roll that out
in our geography and maybe there’s a preliminary step that they inform us that
they intend to do something, but usually they are very much U.S.-centered.
And then they just implement these things in our geography, so to be very honest
it’s not a global team where we say okay this is a global company let’s have
equal representation, sit down at a round table and decide what to do here, to
cater for the needs of the countries outside of the United States, we are very
much dominated by our support by U.S. needs and then we have to see how we
can live with it or how we can adapt it here (Senior European-level HR manager).
 
The influence of corporate HQ also shows up in the operation of policies
in the two substantive areas of HR/IR considered in this paper.
 
Industrial Relations.
 
The impact of the home country shows up very
clearly in the area of employee representation. The welfare capitalist, American
roots of the firm in Europe are evident through a strong preference for
avoiding unions wherever possible. While this does not take the form of a
formal central policy, managers in all of the countries we examined are
aware of the parent company’s nonunion heritage. Moreover, its corporate
culture, which is emphasized in induction programs and in formal value
statements, places great emphasis on “individualism.” In practice, as explained
in more detail below, this translates into our host country’s operations as
an unambiguous nonunion approach in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
In Germany, the firm left its sectoral agreement in the 1990s to negotiate a
firm-level agreement with a moderate union, but continues to work within
the works councils system. In Spain, ITco has no engagement with sectoral
bargaining, although it does not break with its provisions, but does largely
ignore works councils which, at least in ITco, are very much weaker than in
Germany.
One historical example of the strength of feeling on the union issue can
be found in the UK subsidiary. During the 1970s, unions were pushing to
recruit members and succeeded in using the quasi-statutory union recog-
nition procedure that was in place at the time to force the issue. British
managers campaigned hard against recognition, stressing the paternalistic
side of the company. One of those involved in the managerial campaign
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reported that managers had told the workforce that “you’re joining ITco,
ITco look after you from cradle to grave.” Another tactic was to stress that
the existing company council did the job of representation effectively and
there was no need for an “outside” influence. These tactics worked, and
workers voted by a large majority against union recognition. A senior man-
ager who had been involved in the company’s campaign described the “halo
effect” that they had enjoyed for some time following this victory in the eyes
of corporate HQ:
 
So we were heroes to the States. Here was this system, this great system that
was the creation of (the founding family), this was the system being tested. So
we had letters of congratulation, “wonderful achievement,” “shows the system
works.” It was a vindication that had never been attained before, because there
had been no vote on the ITco system (retired UK HR director).
 
Hence, the corporate industrial relations philosophy of ITco is clear. That
this remains the case was underlined by our respondents. The following
quotation from an HR business partner in Ireland, on dealing with grie-
vances, is typical.
 
It has happened (that a group of employees have come to discuss an issue
collectively). We would diffuse the situation and deal with each one (of the
employees) one-by-one, each person one-by-one. That’s typical ITco practice.
We don’t deal with collectives.
 
The historic means of retaining nonunion status, or of restricting collec-
tive influence in more institutionalized systems, remain to some extent
present. Paying above market rates, open door policies and a good working
environment were mentioned by a variety of respondents, and seen, par-
ticularly by Irish respondents, as being in place specifically to forestall
attempts at union organization. However, the picture is necessarily more
complex than this. Most fundamentally, there are industrial relations
systems in which simple union avoidance is not an option.
A good illustration of these pressures is ITco’s response to the German
industrial relations system. Until the early 1990s, ITco was covered by the
sectoral collective agreement of the metal industry. However, as the com-
pany was restructured in the early 1990s, new business units were formed
for the growing service sector elements of the firm’s business. In Germany,
these business units were legally independent, and did not join the employers’
association, although managers deny that bargaining avoidance was a
motive for the legal split. Works councilors forced management to negotiate
a company-level agreement, although this was with a more moderate trade
union based in the service sector. This agreement, which now covers the
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majority of ITco’s German workforce, is unlike the company-based agree-
ments in some larger German firms such as Volkswagen, in that it only
specifies minimum rather than actual terms and conditions. The implication
of this is that each formally independent business unit can negotiate its own
terms and conditions with its works council. The most important substan-
tive aspect of the company agreement was a general increase in the working
week from 36 to 38 hours, with significant flexibility to impose longer hours.
More recently, the service sector union has agreed to negotiate jointly with
the more established metal working union within ITco. However, this has
not been accepted by ITco management.
In Spain, while applying the terms of sectoral negotiation is compulsory
because of the extension of the terms of sectoral agreements to nonsigna-
tory firms, HR managers explained that they did not want to engage in any
national or sectoral collective bargaining institutions and processes. They
considered the sectoral collective agreements which applied to their different
legal entities as mere legislation to be fulfilled:
 
This is unavoidable. Our approach is not to deal within the different collective
bargaining processes. Your margin to maneuver there is very limited, at the end
all companies share the same basic rules of the game. So why spend your time
and resources there? Our strategy is to avoid the limits of the collective agree-
ments by the introduction of our own practices and policies . . . Pay in the top
quartile of the market, that is always more than the dictates of the collective
agreement, is one of the best strategies (HR director, Spain).
 
The approach of disengagement from sectoral bargaining is however not
universal, and decisions on how to tackle national bargaining systems seem
to be devolved to the national level. For example, the French HR director
has a significant role in the negotiation of the sectoral agreement in metal-
working. The contrast here with the German approach can probably be
explained on two fronts: first, the impact of the sectoral agreement on firm-
level practice is less marked in France than in Germany; second, in France,
firms of any size are inevitably covered by one or other sectoral agreement,
as firm-level agreements can currently only supplement sectoral agreements
rather than replace them, and attempts to change which sector a company
falls under provoke significant union resistance.
In addition to collective bargaining systems, German and Spanish man-
agers also have to operate, at least in principle, with systems of workplace
representation. Here, the approach taken varies with the strength of the
institutions. ITco complies with the German works council system, which is
generally seen in a relatively positive light by German managers:
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One advantage of co-determination is certainly that issues are being discussed
intensively and you give it quite some thought before putting it into practice.
Sometimes it takes more time before you implement it, but if  you put it into
practice it works better (German HR manager).
 
However, a senior works councilor suggested that centralization and
more short-term change within the corporation makes life more difficult for
employee representatives:
 
It has changed insofar that we bargained directly with the German manage-
ment more often in the past, whereas today (policy) has to be synchronized at
least with (European HQ) or even with (corporate HQ) to bring harmonization
effects . . . into alignment with these national requirements. The (working con-
ditions) have become more difficult in the way that in the past we had sufficient
time for discussion. This has been shortened drastically because in many coun-
tries, managerial decisions can be executed directly and do not have to be
negotiated with the works council.
 
In ITco Spain, however, where works councils are significantly weaker,
the managerial approach is much less compliant. Spanish labor law gives
works councils the right to information and consultation, with the aim of
reaching agreement, on decisions which will lead to substantial changes in
work organization or contractual relations (cf. EIRO 2003). If  management
and works councils fail to agree, but managers implement a change in any
case, the works council has the right to challenge the move in a labor court.
However, in ITco, the HR director was confident that such challenges
would be unlikely in the event of disagreement. This is primarily because of
the weakness of organization of the works councils in ITco in Spain.
Turning to the less regulated host countries, there is virtually no evidence
of collective employee representation or union presence in Ireland. The
same statement was also true in the United Kingdom until recently, but
the business decision to enter the outsourcing market, and hence take over the
existing workforces of client organizations, has to some extent weakened the
nonunion ethos. This is partly because the operations ITco is taking over
often have high union membership (interestingly, in Spain, where the same
pattern emerged, this was one stated reason for splitting the legal identity
of the various divisions). While this has not transformed the general picture
of a predominantly nonunion operation in the United Kingdom, it has to
some extent eroded it. As one respondent put it:
 
What has happened of course is ITco UK is intent on staying nonunion and
what has happened of  course since they’ve brought people in from other
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companies and they’ve brought in trade unions, and they’ve been willing to do that.
Now that would not have happened, certainly it could never have happened
easily . . . (in the past). The company believed . . . that people couldn’t get a better
deal with trade unions. . . . It didn’t really want to encourage an independent
force. Then suddenly this gets pushed to one side by market conditions,
because it would be quite difficult to service a number of companies unless you
took in their labor force, and their labor force was already trade unionized
anyway (retired HR director, UK).
 
The above quotation, indicating that ITco UK would previously have
turned down business rather than work with unions, illustrates how strongly
attached the UK subsidiary was to the corporate ideology. However, the
current challenge to the foundations of the anti-union philosophy in the
United Kingdom is more serious than a move towards market-led pragma-
tism in decisions about service provision. The outsourcing business, unlike
ITco’s previous core businesses, is highly competitive, and ITco does not
have market dominance. Cost-cutting pressures are strong (in particular, the
cutting of shift allowances has raised strong collective grievances), and the
nature of work and skills is to a far greater extent industry-specific than
firm specific. The logic of the internal labor market, on which ITco’s welfare
capitalist model has been based, is much weakened, as is the capacity to
offer above-market wages and offer substantial job security. This has the
effects both of weakening the firm’s preoccupation with union avoidance,
and of weakening employees’ commitment to the company, and strengthen-
ing their perceived need for union protection. Significantly, contracting in
of employees onto ITco contracts inevitably impedes the operation of some
HR practices, such as highly selective recruitment policies, and complicates
the operation of the performance appraisal system, at least for existing
employees that are transferred into ITco.
In addition, the whole issue of transferred contracts is a significant source
of grievance both for existing ITco employees, who perceive less competent
employees being given many of the benefits of long-standing employees, and
to many of the transferred employees, who perceive themselves as suffering
from a lack of career opportunities in the wider organization and an effec-
tive cap on wage increases.
However, at the same time as the company and employee bulwarks
against unions are weakening in the outsourcing operations, another factor
is weakening the structural basis of viable unionism there, namely the
capacity for remote service provision which makes outsourcing work inter-
nationally mobile to some extent. This is a relatively new phenomenon for
ITco’s service sector employees, and while ITco is likely to require significant
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numbers of  employees in each country for the foreseeable future, the
threat of relocating work to lower cost countries (mainly in eastern Europe)
operates as a constraint on collective organization and an implicit threat for
employees wishing to unionize, as well as a disciplinary mechanism on
unions in those countries where they are present.
There is evidence that national differences in negotiation and represen-
tation have had some substantive impact. For example, in Germany, a work-
force reduction of  40 percent in the early 1990s was achieved without
compulsory redundancies. As with other companies in Germany, voluntary
early retirement and redeployment were the preferred methods, supported
by the works council. As budgets were more important at ITco than head-
count, an unpaid increase in weekly working hours as a result of a new
company collective bargaining agreement was used by German managers
to argue that half  of the labor cost reduction requested had already been
achieved.
Spanish, UK, and Irish managers, however, strongly indicated in some
cases that the firm’s commitment to employment security had lessened over
recent years, although efforts were still made to redeploy those seen as good
performers. The following quotation is typical.
 
Since (the 1990s) it is not correct to talk of the old, traditional ITco culture.
This corporate culture doesn’t exist anymore. Jobs for life here? If  the bottom-
line goes really well, yes, jobs for life for the correct performers . . . if  not
everybody knows what happened in the past (HR partner, Spain).
 
Yet, according to the HR manager and the works councilor interviewed,
ITco Germany still follows an employment security policy. The main
change with the past is that a specific job position is no longer guaranteed.
Various training programs and initiatives have been deployed to increase the
long-run flexibility of employees, alongside a clause in the company collec-
tive agreement which grants employees a right to training. As a result of
redeployment combined with natural attrition, ITco did not have to dismiss
employees in the latest round of cost cutting. It does therefore appear that
collective representation in Germany, perhaps combined with qualitative
flexibility, has affected substantive outcomes, in that employment security
remains stronger for ITco’s employees in this country than elsewhere, as a
result in part of managers’ willingness and ability to negotiate change in a
relatively consensual manner.
In summary, ITco’s overall style of managing industrial relations can
clearly be traced back to welfare capitalist assumptions arising from em-
bedded features of  the American business system. Clearly, however, in
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continental European employment systems, a straight transfer of this style
is not feasible. In general, ITco makes a series of adaptations to local insti-
tutional regimes. However, these adaptations, which are devolved mainly
to host country managers, are clearly designed at preserving some degree of
functional equivalence with the parent company’s policy and philosophy.
 
Pay and Performance Management.
 
Whereas the corporate approach to
industrial relations is better described as a philosophy than a policy, with
adaptations to national necessities, the global approach to pay and perfor-
mance management is an area with very tight central control. The over-
riding aim of uniformity is evidenced by the fact that the corporation’s policies
in this area have been legally challenged in more than one European country.
The global policy in this area can be divided into several components.
First, in the area of job grading, ITco changed its system radically in the
1990s. Until then the corporation relied on a very detailed “job post”-based
system, historically typical of larger U.S. firms (Marsden 1999), that was
administered by compensation managers. This included over 5000 posi-
tions that were allocated to 24 salary grades. At that time, a new system was
introduced that relied on just three factors (skills, job scope, and leadership)
and 10 broad bands. Responsibility for assigning employees to bands was
devolved to line managers, with business unit-level targets for the percent-
age of employees in each band. The UK respondents in particular empha-
sized the links between these broad bands and globally established “career
paths” governing the internal labor market. The grading system operates
more or less uniformly across our four countries, although there is some
works council involvement in the allocation of individuals to bands in the
German subsidiary.
The company’s system of performance appraisal is uniform globally for
all employees, and based on performance against agreed objectives under a
number of broad foci, namely how the individual contributes to ITco’s
overall strategies, how the individual performs relative to defined goals, and
how the team or group engages to achieve the goals or strategy. Managers
across Europe agree that this system, which replaced a much more detailed
performance matrix, was a European initiative. This is now incorporated
into the corporate policy, including the United States, and forms part of the
appraisal for every ITco employee in the divisions we examined. It is clear
that the performance review process is seen as critically important in ITco,
reflecting a strong performance-driven culture linked to performance
metrics at individual, department/team and plant/unit-level.
In terms of the determination of merit pay, the system is based on a
forced distribution with defined percentages of the payroll increase for each
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category of performers. Managers are “actively required” to place only 10
to 15 percent of their subordinates in the highest category A, 60 to 70
percent in B, 10 to 28 percent in C and 2 to 5 percent in D. The highest
performers receive 1.5 to 2 times the average merit increase, B employees
the average, those in category C, 0.6 times the average and those in D must
not receive any increase. The same appraisal process also partly determines
the distribution of the bonus. This should normally reach 10 percent of
annual salaries, and is determined by profitability and turnover growth,
and is shared according to the performance category in which an individual
is placed.
These two mechanisms of linking pay to performance were evident in all
the countries. The company’s principle that the lowest performers should
not receive a salary increase is translated into practice relatively easily in
some countries such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, in that there are
no significant regulatory barriers to its operation. There was, however, some
evidence that the practice of  the forced distribution was not followed
uniformly in the United Kingdom, with some line managers and units
apparently disagreeing with the principle of  “forcing” and not applying
the system fully. Particularly, some line managers in smaller units refused to
place any individuals in the lowest performing group, as they perceived this
to be unfair.
In the German operations, operating a forced distribution with effects on
pay requires considerable finessing of the industrial relations system.
Indeed, for ITco Germany, the introduction of variable pay was a signifi-
cant reason for leaving the system of sectoral bargaining; the metalworking
agreement in practice determines about 90 percent of the annual salary
increases, so that only 10 percent is left for individual incentives. Another
barrier to the company’s pay and performance management system in Ger-
many is that base pay is the subject of collective bargaining, which produces
an across the board increase. However, following agreement on this with the
union, the company agreed a “wage matrix” with the works council which
links pay to performance. For those employees exhibiting poor perfor-
mance, the collectively agreed wage increase is consolidated into basic pay;
however, as the total level of pay is generally above the minimum agreed in
firm-level bargaining, the company is able to reduce additional forms of
remuneration to ensure that poor performers do not gain.
Given the publicity surrounding the General Electric model of “culling”
the lowest performers in a forced distribution (Lawler 2002), and the poten-
tial difficulties in applying such a system in some European employment
systems, we explored whether there were consequences for the poorest
performers beyond the issue of  pay. This is potentially a problem in a
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European context because by definition a forced distribution does not neces-
sarily identify employees who are failing to conform to the requirements of
their job, but merely compares performance against other employees. In
other words, forced distribution, when used to make decisions on employ-
ment security, is dependent on the principle of “employment at will,” which
is not present in European employment systems.
A number of respondents tended to stress the efforts taken to ensure that
poor performance was rectified. For instance, a senior German works coun-
cilor stated:
 
. . . there is a very small amount of employees every year who do not participate
in the development of salaries. In these cases there are, and this is agreed upon
(i.e. with the works council), measures in order to lead those (under-performing
employees) back to performance. And if  they perform, they will participate in
the next increase in salary. These are measures such as further training, coach-
ing, transfer, etc. And within this system you can make up a missed salary
increase in a very short time.
 
In the German case, there is a collective bargaining side-agreement,
which foresees training for employees who did not receive an increase.
Equally, in the Irish operations, where there is no collective employee influ-
ence, managers stressed efforts to rectify poor performance:
 
I suppose if  you took it that there’s a likelihood that this 10 percent population
in the low, very low bracket, we would have an expectation of ourselves that
we would turn 7 percent of them around and have them performing at least the
middle of the road by the end of any given year (business partner, Ireland).
 
However, the implications for those with repeated poor performance were
clear:
 
The ones that don’t move would be managed out. Now that would be a very
small amount of people across the board (business partner, Ireland).
I think if  you got a four, the next thing would be your P45 (termination of
employment form). I suppose in that situation, your manager would definitely
be telling you before the event if you were going to be a four (employee, Ireland).
 
In Spain, where the legal barriers to the dismissal of permanent employees
are high, the consequences of  being in the lowest part of  the forced dis-
tribution are similar to those in Germany, with the significant difference
that the Spanish subsidiary does not deal with unions in relation to this
matter. If  after extensive training the lowest performers are not able to
change their marks over a maximum of 2 years, they are “invited” to leave
the company, but receive severance pay which is usually over the legal
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minimum in order to avoid union conflict. The UK situation is similar to
the Irish case. However, one important contingent factor is that while core
employment in ITco Ireland has grown significantly recently, the ITco UK
has been prone to restructuring and downsizing. It was acknowledged by
managers that performance ratings were used to identify candidates for
redundancy during these periods.
The latter policy is of uncertain legal validity in many European states,
and has, for instance, been challenged in the French labor court. A policy
of quotas for employees deemed incompetent, which is aimed at making job
cuts and which circumvents the statutory procedures involved in economic
redundancies, constitutes a misuse of an assessment procedure under
French law. While the use of forced distributions to determine wage
increases is common in France, its use to determine job competence is not
legally valid as such appraisal systems are not seen as using an objective
definition of what constitutes acceptable performance.
To summarize, ITco appears to be somewhat less willing to admit deri-
vations from its global policy in the area of pay and performance manage-
ment than with regard to industrial relations. Clearly, pressures for interna-
tional integration are felt strongly in this respect, as the desire to centralize
this aspect of policy is driven both by the desire to create an internal labor
market with international flexibility, and the ability to monitor performance
centrally. While ITco is a “deviant innovator” with regard both to industrial
relations and the management of pay in its European subsidiaries, the latter,
for which control is predominantly at the regional and global levels, appears
to be less adaptable to national-level institutions, even where this means
that subsidiaries operate on the limits of the law.
 
Conclusion
 
The findings in the paper support the notion of a dynamic, multilevel
version of institutionalist analysis as a way of understanding the manage-
ment of labor across borders within MNCs: It is dynamic in that business
systems evolve over time, altering the rationalities of actors embedded in
these systems; and it is multilevel in that we emphasize the importance of
the interaction between extra-firm institutions and intra-firm processes at a
number of different levels. Thus, we have shown that this is more than
simply a story of a firm responding to a turbulent market environment;
institutional pressures and intra-firm political processes are key elements in
the way that MNCs operate. This interaction can be understood within the
framework of “four key influences” described above.
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The first three of these worked together to lead the firm towards an
internationally standardized approach to managing labor across borders,
strongly influenced by American norms. Corporate strategy was clearly
based on an attempt to build internationally integrated businesses with the
capability to serve international customers, something that has knock-
on effects in downstream functions like HR. A more specific driver of
standardized HR policies was a desire to develop a cadre of internationally
mobile staff. The nature of these internationally integrated policies is signifi-
cantly influenced by the country-of-origin effect, something that shows up
in a number of ways. The strong influence from the corporate center is itself
a trait of U.S. MNCs, as is the tendency to make radical shifts in business
strategy (Ferner et al. 2004; Hall and Soskice 2001). The “welfare capitalist”
tradition is further evidence of American traits showing through at the
international level, while the way in which this has been eroded by the
pressures of  globalization and the push for “shareholder value” is part of
a wider pattern in the U.S. business system (O’Sullivan 2000); indeed,
arguments about the increased importance of a very short-term business
performance was mentioned as a significant pressure on workforce manage-
ment by several of our respondents. Perhaps the most striking evidence of
a country-of-origin effect was the deep-rooted ideological antipathy to
collectivism. While they are more difficult to measure, it is also plausible
to argue that “dominance effects” have played their part in shaping the
company’s approach. The reassertion of control from the HQ in the 1990s
coincided with the renewal of the American “dominance” or “hegemony”
after two decades in which the German and Japanese economies had
appeared to be performing more strongly. More specifically, the IT sector
became increasingly dominated by U.S. firms in this period, thereby pro-
viding a supportive context for corporate policies that are modeled on
home country operations.
The findings also demonstrate the way that these influences vary over
time: generally speaking, the pressures towards building internationally
integrated operations have grown in recent years; the strength of  the
country of  origin effect has fluctuated markedly in ITco over the last
three decades or so; and the nature of dominance effects also shifts with
variations in comparative economic performance and also with prevailing
economic orthodoxies. Thus, the analysis supports a dynamic conception
of  how MNCs are influenced by economic conditions and institutional
configurations.
Our analysis has also demonstrated that there are significant barriers to
the combined push for uniform policies based mainly on home country
lines. Host country effects have taken the form of the need to engage in
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systems of collective bargaining and accept workplace representation in
Germany, France, and Spain, and to be more tolerant towards represen-
tation in the United Kingdom. However, a central theme of the findings
from all the countries has been the “malleability” of host country systems.
The apparent willingness of managers in Spain to overrule the views of the
workplace representatives and risk a legal challenge which rarely materializes
is one illustration of this, while the opting out of the metalworking collec-
tive agreement in Germany so that the firm can deal with a more moderate
union is another. At least in the latter case, the firm’s actions were also greatly
facilitated by changes in the host business system, namely the weakening of
the German sectoral bargaining system under the twin pressures of globali-
zation and reunification.
Evidently, institutional influences leave a degree of “social space” that
organizational actors can exploit. Institutional forces shape, but do not
determine, the way that MNCs function. Since different groups of actors
will look to advance different agendas and interests, the logical outcome is
that organizational politics are a key feature of the way that international HR
policies are formed and operationalized. As we have seen, organizational
politics and institutional forces interact at a number of different levels: the
nature of international institutions and the distinctiveness of the domestic
business system are central influences over the orientation of senior man-
agers; specialized knowledge of the key institutions that govern economic
activity in a particular country represents one source of power that one
group of managers can use to their advantage in dealing with groups in
other countries; and within workplaces and business units, actors have some
room for maneuver to operate corporate policies in ways that were not
intended by the creators of the policies. Therefore, institutional pressures
should be seen as operating at a number of different levels within MNCs,
providing support for our notion of the need for a multilevel analysis.
Overall, we have developed an analytical framework that has national
level institutions at its core, but one that is also sensitive to the way in which
institutions evolve over time and to the way that they interact with the
agency of organizational actors at a range of levels. This provides a richer
understanding of how firms such as ITco manage their international work-
forces than accounts which adopt a predominantly static view of culture or
those that rely solely on the market environment.
The case study data utilized in this paper are of course not without their
limitations, meaning that some important questions could not be addressed,
three of which we discuss here. First, while the case study covers a range of
host countries with quite different institutional frameworks, they are all
developed market economies. This raises the question of what the situation
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is in the firm’s operations in developing countries. It is possible that the
scale of the cultural or institutional “distance” between the United States
and, say, African countries means that there is less attempt to transfer
practices to sites in these locations. Alternatively, the lack of any concerted
attempt to push standardized practices to these locations may reflect the
role that these sites play as low-cost production sites, with management
seeing little incentive to transfer practices used for workers in developed
countries. A third possibility is that transfer does occur but that the adjust-
ments and clashes with host business systems will be greater.
Second, by only looking at subsidiaries in Europe the data do not posi-
tion us to address the question of how the roles of various regional levels
of management differ. We have demonstrated that the European level has
become an increasingly important axis within the firm, but is the same true
of Asia–Pacific for example? Might we expect the regional management
structure in the Asia–Pacific region to be more or less influential than its
European counterpart? One possibility is that the peculiarities of the busi-
ness systems in the region, and their differences from the U.S. business
system, make regional managers crucial intermediaries between the parent
firm and the national markets in the region. Another possibility, however,
is that the low cost, and hence low status, nature of some of the operations
in the region makes them dispensable, thereby putting management in a
weak position.
Third, by adopting a single case study method, we cannot address the
potential role of corporate characteristics in mediating the influence of insti-
tutional pressures leading to variations between MNCs in how these effects
are played out at firm and site level. It is inevitable that studies in MNCs
in other sectors, of different vintage and size, pursuing different strategies,
adopting different modes of entry, and from different countries of origin
would produce findings at variance with those presented here. Further quali-
tative research is needed in order to establish the different ways in which the
“four influences” operate in different structural, market and national settings.
Research into HRM within MNCs should, therefore take account of the
four influences: country of origin, dominance effects, pressures for inter-
national integration, and host country effects. Naturally, these influences do
not operate uniformly across the population of MNCs; for example, in
some respects all four influences may be partly sectoral or even occu-
pational, rather than purely national. Moreover, the nature and strength of
the influences alters over time, because of wider political, economic, and
institutional change.
It is important to point out, however, that these influences, even if  applied
to a specific MNC, as in this paper, cannot simply be read off  as elements
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of a contingency model. Taking account of the agency of MNCs and of
actors within it is fundamental to a viable research framework. For example,
the power of  MNCs themselves, either individually or en bloc, to affect
the nature of “social space” within host country business systems through
lobbying or “deviant innovation” is a significant issue here. However, as we
have illustrated equally importantly, actors at a variety of levels within the
MNC have some power to interpret the nature of such influences at the level
of the firm, or its subsidiaries, or both.
In summary, further qualitative research into the transfer of HR policy
within MNCs is required, investigating outcomes in a variety of structural,
business strategic and national settings. It is important that research
programs are developed in which fieldwork investigates all levels of the firm
with an influence on the practice of HR, from the workplace to the corpo-
rate headquarters. Such work needs to be institutionally informed, while
avoiding deterministic assumptions about the effects of institutional influ-
ences. The framework developed here, which takes into account institu-
tional influences but which examines organizational agency within them,
would, in our view, be a useful starting point for such efforts.
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Appendix: Interviews
The vast majority of the interviews were carried out by two or more
members of the research team and some were conducted by members of
different national teams. Indeed, the national research teams regularly
exchanged information during the study. Interviews were carried out with a
range of respondents: many of these were in the HR function; some were
in other managerial functions, such as the head of a business unit; and some
were non-managerial employees. The interviews were semi-structured, were
carried out with company permission on site, were conducted in the respon-
dents’ native language and were fully transcribed and analyzed using QSR
N5 software.
TABLE A-1
T I
Country HR Other Mgt Employees Total
UK 4 1 12 17
Ireland 5 8 4 17
Spain 3 2 2 7
Germany 2 0 3* 5
France 1 — — 1
Euro HQ 7 — — 7
Corporate HQ 4 — — 4
Total 58
*Employee representatives.

